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broadly to protect employees. The Court held in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar that plaintiffs must assume the
onerous, if not impossible, task of proving retaliation claims using the “butfor” causation standard. This high burden of proof not only forces
employees with limited information to analyze an employer’s multifaceted
motivations, but also it allows employers to skirt around Title VII liability.
This decision is troubling because it runs contrary to Congress’s intent to
strengthen antidiscrimination laws. Although Justice Ginsberg called for
prompt congressional action in her dissent, there is little chance a statutory
fix will be enacted in the near future. This Note therefore argues that courts
and the EEOC must employ their own stopgap measures to protect
employees from Nassar’s adverse effects. It outlines two alternatives to
congressional action: first, a judicial reinterpretation of but-for causation
that employs modern principles of tort law to create a more realistic burden
for plaintiffs; second, an EEOC enforcement mechanism that encourages
compliance with antiretaliation laws and effectively roots out frivolous
retaliation claims. These proposals are intended to shift the conversation
away from the changes Congress should make to Title VII’s language if
and when it does take action, to alternative and practicable solutions that
can help stem Nassar’s adverse effects while we wait on Capitol Hill.
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INTRODUCTION
For over two decades, Congress and the Supreme Court have struggled
to clarify the issue of factual causation in individual disparate treatment
employment discrimination cases.1 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 the
1

There are two types of individual disparate treatment cases. Both deal with employment actions
due to one’s protected status, but pretext cases involve adverse employment actions allegedly based on
only an impermissible discriminatory intent. Mixed-motive cases, on the other hand, involve an adverse
employment action allegedly based on both a lawful business justification and an impermissible
discriminatory intent.
2
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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Supreme Court developed a new, plaintiff-friendly proof framework that
allowed claimants to prove their individual disparate treatment claims
under a lesser “motivating factor” causation standard.3 The Court’s
decision was controversial, however, because it was also thought to
“undermine[] protection of federal equal employment opportunity laws”4
by allowing an employer to escape liability under Title VII if it could prove
it would have made the same employment decision absent discrimination.5
In response to this decision, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991.6 Although the 1991 Civil Rights Act rejected Price Waterhouse’s
“same decision” defense to mixed-motive cases, it partially codified Price
Waterhouse by expressly permitting mixed-motive analysis in Title VII7
discrimination cases, as well as its accompanying “motivating factor”
causation standard.8 Thus, in mixed-motive cases, Title VII plaintiffs need
only demonstrate that their protected trait played a contributing or
“motivating factor” in the adverse action, even though other factors also
influenced the decision.9
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, failed to address whether the
mixed-motive framework also applies to other employment discrimination
statutes, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) or
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).10 Furthermore, because the
3

Id. at 249. The new proof framework gave plaintiffs the freedom to choose which framework they
would use to prove their individual disparate treatment cases. Those who did not follow Price
Waterhouse’s mixed-motive proof framework had to use the proof framework set forth by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which requires that plaintiffs meet
the more stringent “but-for” standard of causation. See infra Part I.B.
4
CHARLES V. DALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS 92-85 A, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: A
LEGAL HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 1 (1992).
5
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (holding that “when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves
[a protected trait] played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s [protected trait] into account”).
6
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; see also DALE, supra note 4.
7
§ 107, 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)).
8
See id.
9
For examples of mixed-motive discrimination cases, see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, and
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), which allowed a plaintiff to allege both real
disciplinary issues and that her sex played a role in her termination. For more on mixed-motive Title
VII retaliation cases that were decided prior to University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), see infra Part IV for a discussion of Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320
(5th Cir. 2010), and Fabela v. Socorro Independent School District, 329 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2003).
10
See Robert Tananbaum, Note, Grossly Overbroad: The Unnecessary Conflict over Mixed
Motives Claims in Title VII Anti-Retaliation Cases Resulting from Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1129, 1138 (2013) (“Congress made various amendments to the ADEA as part of
the 1991 Act, but did not add a mixed motives provision as it did to Title VII. Therefore, whether
Congress intended mixed motives claims to be available under the ADEA had not been made explicit to
that point.”); see also Cheryl L. Anderson, Unification of Standards in Discrimination Law: The
Conundrum of Causation and Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, 82 MISS. L.J. 67, 84 (2013)
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Civil Rights Act of 1991 only added statutory language to Title VII’s
antidiscrimination section, it was unclear whether the mixed-motive
framework also applied to Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.11
Antiretaliation cases, while often arising from claims of antidiscrimination,
also deal with employment actions due to one’s protected conduct, such as
reporting discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).
For almost twenty years after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, some
courts applied the mixed-motive “motivating factor” framework to Title
VII antiretaliation claims and even other antidiscrimination statutes.12 In
2009, however, the Supreme Court decided in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc. not to extend the mixed-motive proof framework to ADEA
cases.13 Four years later, the Supreme Court in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar also rejected the motivating factor
causation standard in Title VII antiretaliation cases.14 Instead, the Court
held that a Title VII retaliation plaintiff must prove that “the desire to
retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”15 In
other words, a plaintiff must show that the protected activity was of high
relative importance to the employer, and but for the plaintiff’s protected
conduct, he or she would not have suffered the adverse action.
The Supreme Court, which once interpreted statutory antiretaliation
provisions broadly to protect employees,16 changed its course with

(“Congress amended certain aspects of the ADA in the 1991 Act as well, but did not incorporate the
motivating factor language.”).
11
See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or Sound Legal Reasoning? Why Most
Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s Motivating-Factor
Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World (But Should), 64 ALA. L. REV. 1067,
1068–69 (2013).
12
Id. at 1079–85 (illustrating that some courts after the 1991 Civil Rights Act applied the
motivating factor standard to retaliation claims); see also Anderson, supra note 10, at 89 (noting that
after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, some lower courts assumed the mixed-motive framework could be
applied to ADA claims and generally applied Title VII’s motivating factor standard to such claims).
13
557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (rejecting the use of the mixed-motive framework in ADEA claims
because “[u]nlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish
discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor”). Instead, the McDonnell Douglas
“but-for” proof framework applies to all ADEA claims. See infra Part I.B for further discussion of this
proof framework.
14
See 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
15
Id. at 2528.
16
See infra Parts III.A–B. See generally David A. Drachsler, Supreme Court Sets High Bar for
Title VII Retaliation Claims, 64 LAB. L.J. 205, 205 (2013) (“The Supreme Court has set an
extraordinarily high bar for an employee to prove retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. This burden is not demanded of almost any other employee claiming retaliation under a wide
variety of other laws prohibiting retaliation.”); Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation
Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 451 (2010) (“In Supreme Court retaliation cases, despite the
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Nassar.17 By requiring plaintiffs to prove retaliation claims using “but-for”
causation, the Court forced plaintiffs to analyze an employer’s multifaceted
motivations and explain them away in complicated counterfactuals to
demonstrate that, in the absence of protected activity, the adverse action
would not have been taken.18 Commentators agree it is difficult, if not
impossible, for an employee to discern a decisionmaker’s thinking
process.19 The high bar plaintiffs must meet to establish but-for causation
runs counter to the public policy of Title VII, which “is to enable
employees to engage in protected activities without fear of retaliation.”20 A
less restrictive causation standard, such as a motivating factor standard, is
better suited for retaliation cases, particularly mixed-motive cases, because
plaintiffs need not engage in an in-depth investigation of the employer’s
motivations. Furthermore, those who engage in motivating factor
discrimination will not go unpunished because there would be a lower
threshold for holding discriminating employers liable. The motivating
factor causation standard would ensure optimal deterrence against
retaliation by only requiring plaintiffs to show that their protected conduct
was a contributing factor that had a tendency to affect the employment
decision.
In her Nassar dissent, Justice Ginsburg decried the divergence from
custom, stating that the majority was “guided neither by precedent, nor by
the aims of legislators who formulated and amended Title VII.”21 Noting
that “[s]hut from the Court’s sight is a legislative record replete with
statements evincing Congress’[s] intent to strengthen antidiscrimination
laws and thereby hold employers accountable for prohibited
discrimination,”22 Justice Ginsburg suggests the Court was blinded by “a
zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims filed against employers.”23
The consequences of this willful blindness are grave: deserving retaliation
Court’s employer-friendly outlook and conservative judicial philosophy, it has protected employees
who act to enforce society’s laws.”).
17
See William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament’s Playbook and Fix
Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 142 (2013) (finding that the Court’s
discussion of meritless claims and the high volume of retaliation cases “is a rather bald assertion that
the Court intends to reduce the number of retaliation claims that are asserted and that go to trial”);
Moberly, supra note 16, at 445 (positing that a but-for causation standard, such as the one adopted in
Nassar, would be “devastating” to retaliation claimants).
18
See Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 881–82 (2010).
19
See Drachsler, supra note 16, at 209.
20
See John Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 547 (2007).
21
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2547 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22
Id. at 2545–46.
23
Id. at 2547. For the majority’s discussion of the “ever-increasing frequency” of retaliation claims
filed with the EEOC and the threat of frivolous claims “siphon[ing] resources from efforts by employer,
administrative agencies, and courts to combat workplace harassment,” see id. at 2531–32.
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claimants with valuable information will be deterred from having their day
in court because employees have limited access to information that might
evince an employer’s intent.24
Although Congress has intervened when the Supreme Court acts
counter to the legislature’s intent,25 the calls to action by Justice Ginsburg
and other scholars26 will likely go unanswered.27 Commentators argue that
Congress is unlikely to fix the language in Title VII’s retaliation
provision.28 Most of Congress’s attention is going to the more “dramatic”
cases from the Supreme Court’s 2013 term and today’s Congress “shows
little interest in the plight of victims of job discrimination.”29 There is no
compelling figure such as Lilly Ledbetter—who incited the media outcry
when the Supreme Court denied her compelling gender pay equality claim
24

See id. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When assessing an employer’s multiple motives, ‘to
apply “but-for” causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the
employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been different.’” (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 191 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting))); see also Michael C. Harper, The Causation
Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled
Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 71–72 (2010) (“[P]roving that . . .
consideration [of a forbidden status category or activity] actually occurred within the conscious, or
unconscious, thought processes of decision makers is usually problematic.” (footnote omitted));
Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705, 718–19 (2014) (“Undermining the significance and usefulness of
being protected from retaliation makes the antidiscrimination statutes much less available to workers in
an at-will world where challenging the employer is extremely risky.”).
25
Regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress abrogated ten Supreme Court decisions when
it amended Title VII and the ADA; regarding the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Congress addressed
the Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); and regarding
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Congress abrogated two Supreme Court
decisions. See Corbett, supra note 17, at 141.
26
See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (calling on Congress to promptly
remedy the Court’s “misguided judgment” as it did once before with the Civil Rights Restoration Act);
see also, e.g., Corbett, supra note 17, at 142 (urging Congress not to “continue its approach of simply
fixing what it considers errant decisions” and instead implement a “thorough reform” of employment
discrimination law as the United Kingdom’s Parliament recently did); Harper, supra note 24, at 144–45
(suggesting that Congress should broadly consider the issue of causation for all federal employment
statutes and should clarify provisions, express mandates or add new definitions).
27
See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman & Deborah L. Brake, Revenge: The Supreme Court Narrows
Protection Against Workplace Retaliation in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar, VERDICT (July 9, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/2013/07/09/revenge-the-supreme-courtnarrows-protection-against-workplace-retaliation-in-university-of-texas-southwestern-medical-center-vnassar [http://perma.cc/V4TP-NA8G] (“Whether the current Congress has the political will to take up
Justice Ginsburg’s challenge is another matter. It strikes us, frankly, as unlikely, in light of other
challenges facing Congress and the present political environment.”).
28
See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 17, at 142 (noting the “most curious” failure of Congress to
respond to Gross and the failure of the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act
(POWADA)).
29
Jeffrey Toobin, Will Ginsburg’s Ledbetter Play Work Twice?, NEW YORKER, June 24, 2013,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/06/ruth-bader-ginsburg-ledbetter-play.html
[http://perma.cc/N383-APFF].
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due to a procedural technicality—to “bring the cause to life” and lobby for
change.30 Because a statutory fix is not feasible at this time, alternative
means of addressing Nassar’s prohibitive but-for causation standard are
necessary.
This Note suggests two alternatives to a statutory “patch” or overhaul.
The first alternative is a judicial reinterpretation of but-for causation using
modern principles of tort law to create a standard that is easier for plaintiffs
to meet. A second option is an EEOC enforcement mechanism that
encourages compliance with antiretaliation laws and effectively roots out
frivolous retaliation claims. These fixes diminish any potential windfall
defendants may gain if they are able to escape liability in a mixed-motives
retaliation case while simultaneously serving the purpose of Title VII by
reducing the incidence of retaliation and rewarding employer compliance.
Part I provides an overview of Title VII and the two proof frameworks
courts applied to Title VII retaliation cases prior to Nassar: the McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green framework, which is premised on but-for
causation,31 and the mixed-motive framework developed by Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins and codified in part by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which employs a “motivating factor” causation analysis.32 Part II
examines the Supreme Court’s historical treatment of Title VII retaliation
claims and contrasts the broad protections afforded to retaliation plaintiffs
in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White33 and Thompson
v. North American Stainless, LP34 with the stringent, pro-employer ruling in
Nassar.35 Part III posits that even if Nassar’s outcome was proper, plaintiffs
with stronger cases, such as Kim Smith in Smith v. Xerox Corp.36 and
Alicia Fabela in Fabela v. Socorro Independent School District,37 will now
face prohibitive costs in bringing their retaliation claims. To allow for
claims such as Kim Smith’s and Alicia Fabela’s to succeed under Nassar,
Part IV begins with the argument that it is imprudent to wait for legislative
intervention and instead suggests a judicial fix for the but-for causation
standard using principles of tort law. Part IV concludes with an
examination of whether a novel EEOC enforcement mechanism that roots

30

Id.
See 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973).
32
490 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075, as recognized in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517 (2013).
33
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
34
131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
35
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
36
602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517.
37
329 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2003).
31
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out retaliation in a more meaningful way by creating compliance incentives
could temper Nassar’s negative impact on future retaliation claimants.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE VII PROOF FRAMEWORKS

A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196438 is “the flagship of federal
employment discrimination law.”39 It prohibits an employer from
discriminating in employment decisions against employees because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.40 Civil rights advocates,
concerned with the denial of equality in the workplace, steered the passage
of Title VII, a “radical” socioeconomic intervention by the U.S.
government.41
Within Title VII, two key provisions provide protections to workers:
the antidiscrimination provision42 and the antiretaliation provision.43 The
antidiscrimination provision prohibits employers from discriminating in
any employment decision based on an employee’s protected status. The
antiretaliation provision, on the other hand, protects employees from an
employer’s adverse retaliatory action to an employee’s (1) opposition to a
prohibited practice under Title VII, or (2) participation in a Title VII
investigation, proceeding, or hearing.44 Although Title VII’s legislative
history contains scarce information regarding the antiretaliation provision,

38

Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–16, 78 Stat. 253, 253–66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C
§§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)).
39
THOMAS R. HAGGARD ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 4 (2d ed.
2008).
40
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
41
SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 94 (2010).
42
§ 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
43
§ 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labormanagement committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job
training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”).
44
For a comparative analysis of the language and purpose of Title VII’s discrimination and
retaliation provisions, see Moberly, supra note 16, at 409–10.
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the Supreme Court has traditionally considered the provision’s key function
as “enforcing [Title VII] and advancing the Act’s goals.”45
B. The Creation of Pretext Analysis and the Introduction of “But-For”
Causation in Employment Discrimination Cases:
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
In 1973, the Court established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green a
proof framework premised on but-for causation that serves as the
foundation for Title VII individual disparate treatment claims.46 McDonnell
Douglas Corp. laid off Percy Green, an African-American mechanic and
lab technician, in the course of a general reduction in workforce.47
Following his termination, Green protested his discharge and the
company’s general hiring practices in a “stall-in.”48 Approximately one
year later, when McDonnell Douglas Corp. publicly advertised for
qualified mechanics, Green reapplied but the manufacturer refused him the
position on the basis of his participation in the stall-in.49
In determining whether racial discrimination motivated the refusal to
rehire Green, the Court established a proof framework which required a
pretext analysis based on but-for causation. Under this framework, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by proving: (1) he is in a
protected class; (2) he applied to and was qualified for an open job
position; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) the position
remained open after he was rejected.50 Once the plaintiff establishes his
prima facie case, the employer has the burden of production to show a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”51 The
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who has the ultimate burden of
persuasion to show that the “[plaintiff]’s stated reason for [the defendant]’s
rejection was in fact pretext” and that his protected status was the but-for
cause of the adverse action.52 This proof framework was designed “not to
force plaintiffs to prove the insufficiency of a good motive as well as the
existence of a discriminatory motive, but rather to offer only an option to
assist plaintiffs with the difficult proof of covert discrimination.”53 The
45

Id. at 386.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47
Id. at 794.
48
Id. “Stall-ins” were popular civil rights demonstrations that involved obstruction of traffic on
roads leading to a plant or factory. Id.
49
Id. at 796.
50
Id. at 802.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 804.
53
Harper, supra note 24, at 79. It is important to note that historically, the McDonnell Douglas
framework was imported into Title VII retaliation cases, as well as cases under different employment
46
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Court accordingly held that on retrial, Green must be allowed to
demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas Corp.’s reason for refusing to reemploy him was a pretext for discrimination; he carried his burden of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination and McDonnell
Douglas Corp. successfully rebutted his claim, pointing to his prior
unlawful acts.54
C. Rise of the Mixed-Motive Proof Framework and
“Motivating Factor” Causation
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.—One of the most important (and
controversial) cases in employment discrimination jurisprudence is the
Supreme Court’s 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision.55 In this
case, the Court established a new framework for mixed-motive cases as an
alternative to the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework.56 Mixed-motive
cases are a class of individual disparate treatment cases where there is
evidence of discriminatory motive in addition to other nondiscriminatory
reasons for the adverse action. Furthermore, Price Waterhouse introduced
the “motivating factor” causation standard to Title VII discrimination
jurisprudence.57
Ann Hopkins worked for the accounting firm Price Waterhouse for
five years when she was nominated as a candidate for partnership.58 In
considering whether Hopkins was denied partnership by Price
Waterhouse’s Policy Board because of her gender, the four-Justice plurality
took issue with the fact that the Policy Board, in response to some of the
partners’ negative reactions to Hopkins’s management style, recommended
that Hopkins act more femininely, wear make-up and jewelry, and style her
hair.59 These reactions, in conjunction with opinions that she was abrasive
and had problems getting along with the staff, resulted in eight partners

discrimination statutes such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). See, e.g., Cofield
v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Although the McDonnell Douglas
framework originally applied to Title VII cases, it is now widely accepted that the framework applies to
claims of discrimination under the ADEA as well.”).
54
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
55
See Michael Z. Green, Retaliatory Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
201, 208 (2014).
56
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
57
See id. (requiring that the plaintiff show that gender “played a motivating part in an employment
decision”).
58
Id. at 233.
59
Id. at 235.
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recommending that Hopkins be denied partnership.60 Hopkins was
accordingly “held” for reconsideration.61
Analyzing the meaning of Title VII’s “because of” language in
§ 2000e-2, the plurality stated: “[S]ince we know that the words ‘because
of’ do not mean ‘solely because of,’ we also know that Title VII meant to
condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate considerations.”62 In permitting the use of a mixed-motive
framework, the plurality held that a plaintiff has to demonstrate only that
the protected trait played a “motivating factor” in the adverse action.63 In a
blow to employees, however, the Price Waterhouse plurality provided a
“same decision” defense to employers that allowed them to escape liability
if they could prove that they “would have made the same decision even if
[they] had not allowed [the protected trait] to play such a role.”64 The Court
therefore reversed the lower court’s judgment against Price Waterhouse
because even though Hopkins proved that gender played a motivating part
in an employment decision, Price Waterhouse must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence—not clear and convincing evidence—that it
would have made the same decision even if her gender had not been taken
into account in order to avoid liability.65
The same decision provision launched a “swift and vigorous
countermobilization by civil rights groups and their allies in Congress” to
buttress Title VII’s employee protections in the face of the Supreme
Court’s efforts to cut back Title VII litigation.66 Despite its complications,67
Price Waterhouse transformed Title VII litigation by establishing a mixedmotive framework in which plaintiffs could prove discrimination using a
motivating factor standard and employers could argue a same decision
affirmative defense that, if successful, allowed them to evade liability.68
60

Id. at 233–35.
Id. at 233.
62
Id. at 241.
63
Id. at 258.
64
Id. at 244–45.
65
Id. at 258.
66
FARHANG, supra note 41, at 172.
67
Justice O’Connor authored a concurrence that is generally viewed as the controlling opinion in
Price Waterhouse. In her concurrence, she called for a narrower, more defendant-friendly “substantial
factor” causation standard, as opposed to the broader, plaintiff-friendly “motivating factor” standard, in
linking the “illegitimate criterion” with the adverse action. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261–79
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). As a result, the divided court’s four opinions created
considerable confusion because each proposed a different causation standard. Compare id. at 258
(plurality opinion) (adopting a “motivating factor” standard), with id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) (adopting a narrower “substantial factor” standard), id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in
the judgment) (accepting Justice O’Connor’s “substantial factor” standard), and id. at 281 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (holding that Title VII liability required “but-for” causation).
68
See id. at 258 (plurality opinion).
61
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2. Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.—The 1991 Civil
Rights Act’s69 amendments to Title VII “sought, manifestly, to restore
nearly all aspects of Title VII’s private enforcement regime to their
condition prior to the summer of 1989,”70 i.e., to the time before cases such
as Price Waterhouse were decided. The political atmosphere was crucial to
ensuring the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s passage. Only a year before, President
George H.W. Bush vetoed what would have been the Civil Rights Act of
1990.71 By 1991, an impending presidential election and the Hill–Thomas
Senate hearings72 focused enough attention on issues relevant to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, such as workplace sexual harassment, that the
legislation garnered overwhelming congressional support.73
In response to Price Waterhouse, § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 added a new section to Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision,
modifying and codifying in part Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive
framework.74 In doing so, the 1991 Act expressly permitted mixed-motive
cases, stating an employment practice could be found unlawful “even
though other factors also motivated the practice,” and formally codified the
plurality’s motivating factor standard in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).75 The
1991 Civil Rights Act also added a provision to Title VII that rejected
Price Waterhouse’s same decision defense, which had allowed employers
to escape liability, and instituted a modified defense wherein employers
would be found partially liable even if they met their burden of
persuasion.76 Specifically, when an employer successfully made a same
69

Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075.
FARHANG, supra note 41, at 189.
71
Id. at 187.
72
See id. at 187–88. In 1991, Congress was conducting Clarence Thomas’s Supreme Court
nomination hearings when Anita Hill, an EEOC employee Thomas formerly supervised, accused him of
sexual harassment. The nation was “riveted” by televised hearings discussing these allegations, and this
national coverage brought attention to the seriousness and pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the
workplace. Id. at 187. At the same time, the 1992 presidential elections were approaching and
Republican opponents to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 felt tremendous pressure to compromise and pass
the bill after a former Klansman, David Duke, made a strong second-place showing in the Republican
primaries for the Louisiana governorship. Id. at 188. In order to disassociate themselves with Duke,
many Republicans felt it was necessary to cooperate with Democrats and pass a civil rights bill. Id.
73
See id. at 187–89; see also DALE, supra note 4, at 3.
74
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). It is important to note the 1991 Civil Rights Act also expanded
Title VII remedies to include compensatory and punitive damages for victims of intentional
discrimination and additionally permitted jury trials under Title VII. DALE, supra note 4, at 2.
75
“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.” § 2000e-2(m); see also Harper, supra note 24, at 92.
76
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (“On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in
the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court: (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive
70
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decision showing, the employee was automatically eligible for declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs, but not damages or
reinstatement.77
For nearly two decades following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts
inconsistently applied the McDonnell Douglas and mixed-motive
frameworks (both the 1991 Act’s and Price Waterhouse’s) to Title VII
antidiscrimination, Title VII antiretaliation, as well as Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
cases.78 Although the 1991 Civil Rights Act only amended provisions
within Title VII, many courts applied the rule of in pari materia79 to the
three statutes, linking their “because of” language and extending the new
Title VII discrimination analysis to similar Title VII retaliation, ADEA,
and ADA claims.80
D. Setting the Stage for Nassar: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
and the Supreme Court’s Refusal to Extend the Mixed-Motive
Framework to the ADEA
The Supreme Court’s 2009 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
decision81 has been described by scholars as surprising,82 confusing,83 and

relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award
damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment,
described in subparagraph (A).”).
77
Id.
78
Corbett, supra note 17, at 139. For a discussion of how courts analyzed Title VII retaliation
claims after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 1079–89. For a discussion of
ADEA cases decided after the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see Anderson, supra note 10, at 80; Harper, supra
note 24, at 100–04; and Tananbaum, supra note 10, at 1137–41.
79
See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 59 n.* (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803)
(“It is an established rule of construction that statutes in pari materia, or upon the same subject, must be
construed with a reference to each other . . . .”); see also Anderson, supra note 10, at 77.
80
See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law: Does the Master
Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 686–87 (2010)
(“Courts, lawyers, and others have spoken essentially a single language of employment discrimination
law as they have applied most of the same theories, frameworks, and principles to all of the laws. The
minor variations in the law applicable to the different employment discrimination statutes might be
likened to different dialects. . . . With a common language, the [lower courts] built a tower that was
largely symmetrical regardless of which part came into view—Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), or the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Despite minor variations,
symmetry seemed to be a salient characteristic of the [law].”).
81
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
82
See Corbett, supra note 17, at 139.
83
See Brian S. Clarke, The Gross Confusion Deep in the Heart of University of Texas Southwest
Medical Center v. Nassar, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 75, 75 (2013).
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complicating because it violated the in pari materia construction of Title
VII and the ADEA by declining to extend the mixed-motive motivating
factor proof framework to ADEA cases.84
The Supreme Court held that “the Court’s interpretation of the ADEA
is not governed by Title VII decisions such as . . . Price Waterhouse” and
ruled that mixed-motive claims are not permitted by the text of the
ADEA.85 Instead, the court held that plaintiffs with disparate treatment
ADEA claims “must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the
employer’s adverse decision.”86 Although the ADEA was modeled after
Title VII and the two statutes were often interpreted similarly,87 the Court
rejected the application of the motivating factor standard to ADEA cases. It
relied on Congress’s failure to make similar changes to the ADEA when it
amended Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to expressly allow
mixed-motive discrimination suits.88 The Court focused on the meaning of
the ADEA’s phrase “because of such individual’s age,” interpreted it as
requiring but-for cause, and placed the burden on plaintiffs to prove “by a
preponderance of the evidence” that age was the but-for cause of the
adverse action.89
Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Civil Rights Act permitted plaintiffs to
prove Title VII’s “because of” language in mixed-motive discrimination
suits with a motivating factor, rather than but-for, causation analysis.
Following Gross, however, courts and scholars were unsure whether it
“close[d] the door to any argument that ‘because of’ language could mean
‘motivating factor,’ rather than the ‘but for’ standard for retaliation claims
under Title VII, the ADEA, and other older statutes.”90 This confusion set
the stage for University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,91
in which the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether mixedmotive claims are permitted in Title VII antiretaliation cases.
II. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR:
REJECTING THE LIBERAL “MOTIVATING FACTOR” CAUSATION STANDARD
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar presented
the Supreme Court with the opportunity to answer whether Title VII
retaliation claimants can apply the mixed motive framework of Title VII’s
84

See Moberly, supra note 16, at 443–44.
Gross, 557 U.S. at 175.
86
Id. at 176.
87
Moberly, supra note 16, at 443.
88
Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (“When Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is
presumed to have acted intentionally.”).
89
Id. at 176–77.
90
Moberly, supra note 16, at 444.
91
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
85
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antidiscrimination provision.92 Naiel Nassar, a medical doctor of Middle
Eastern descent, was a member of the University’s faculty and a staff
physician at the medical center.93 Nassar believed his superior, Dr. Beth
Levine, was biased against him based on his religion and ethnicity.94 After
preliminary negotiations with the hospital suggested he might be able to
work at the hospital without also being on the University’s faculty, he
resigned his teaching post to avoid further harassment from Levine.95 When
he did so, he sent a letter to a number of persons, including Levine’s
supervisor Dr. Gregory Fitz, stating that he resigned because Levine was
harassing him based on her “religious, racial and cultural bias against
Arabs and Muslims.”96
Upset by Nassar’s letter, Fitz said that Nassar publicly humiliated
Levine with his letter and that Levine should be publicly exonerated.97 Fitz
protested that the hospital’s offer to Nassar was inconsistent with the
affiliation agreement’s requirement that all staff physicians also be faculty
members of the University.98 Accordingly, the hospital withdrew Nassar’s
offer, and Nassar filed suit claiming status-based discrimination and
retaliation.99
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s application of a mixedmotive framework to Nassar’s claim and argued instead that, similar to
Gross’s requirement for ADEA suits, a plaintiff claiming retaliation under
Title VII must prove “the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the
challenged employment action.”100 The Court based its reasoning on an
analysis of the “because of” language in Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision,101 finding that there was no “meaningful textual difference”
92

See id. at 2523. For pre-Nassar examples of the confusion surrounding which framework applied
to antiretaliation cases, see Clarke, supra note 83, at 81–82, and Corbett, supra note 17, at 139, which
notes that the breadth of Gross’s holding was left unanswered by the Court.
93
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 2523–24.
96
Id. at 2524.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 2528. It is noteworthy that under this heightened but-for requirement, “burden-shifting no
longer applies, since the plaintiff bears the burden of ruling out that legitimate reasons would have
resulted in the same adverse employment action.” Ryan J. Vlasak, Defining Supervisor Control and
Causation in Wrongful Discharge Litigation, in WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LITIGATION STRATEGIES 6
(2013), available at 2013 WL 5290496.
101
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
(emphasis added)).
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between the text in the antiretaliation provision and that analyzed in
Gross.102
The Court noted that when Congress added the motivating factor
provision to Title VII with the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress inserted it
in Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision but took no action to include it
in the antiretaliation provision.103 The Court concluded that because Title
VII is a “detailed statutory scheme” and was not phrased by Congress in
broad and general terms, it would be improper to treat bans on status-based
discrimination as also prohibiting retaliation.104 Furthermore, the Court
found that a motivating factor analysis in retaliation claims was
inappropriate because the motivating factor provision in § 2000e-2(m) does
not explicitly include retaliation as one of the prohibited discriminatory
actions.105 Accordingly, it reasoned that it would be “improper to conclude
that what Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its
scope” due to § 2000e-2(m)’s “clear language.”106 In addition to rejecting
the argument that the motivating factor standard applies to retaliation cases,
the Court held that the Price Waterhouse standard did not apply because
Price Waterhouse was superseded by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, thus
requiring retaliation plaintiffs prove but-for cause under the McDonnell
Douglas framework.107
It is noteworthy that the Court expressed concern over the fact that
retaliation claims are being made “with ever-increasing frequency” and that
“lessening the causation standard could also contribute to the filing of
frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from [the] efforts by
employer, administrative agencies, and courts.”108 The Court was
particularly concerned by the potential that, with a lower causation
standard, employees who know they are about to be terminated for poor
performance could potentially bring unfounded retaliation claims to
forestall the lawful employment action.109 The Court thus manipulated Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision to serve as a strict gatekeeper in the name of
keeping out future invidious claimants and ensuring the “fair and
responsible allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems.”110
102

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
Id. at 2529.
104
Id. at 2529–30.
105
See id. at 2528.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 2534.
108
Id. at 2531.
109
Id. at 2532.
110
Id. at 2531–33. For further discussion of the benefits of Nassar, see Alan Rupe et al., U.S.
Supreme Court Clarifies the Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof in Title VII Retaliation Actions, 83 J. KAN. B.
ASS’N, 24, 28 (2014), which states:
103
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In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court “seized on a
provision, § 2000e-2(m), adopted by Congress as part of an endeavor to
strengthen Title VII, and turned it into a measure reducing the force of the
ban on retaliation.”111 She highlighted the similar wording used in Title
VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions and noted the
Court’s historical holdings found “a ban on discrimination encompasses
retaliation.”112 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg argued that it is illogical to
believe that Congress meant for retaliation victims to have fewer
protections when the statute does not mention retaliation.113 She found that
because the motivating factor provision includes “any employment
practice,” retaliation claims are included in its scope.114 In the conclusion of
her dissent, Justice Ginsburg called upon Congress to intervene to address
Nassar’s “misguided judgment.”115
Because the political climate is not prime for congressional action, it is
likely her proclamation will go unanswered.116 Congress failed to enact the
Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act (POWADA) in 2009
following Gross,117 and it is even less likely, in light of today’s bipartisan
congressional gridlock, that any legislation amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a) will gain sufficient attention or support.118
III. THE CHANGING TIDES: SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF TITLE
VII’S ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION
Prior to Nassar, the Court’s employee retaliation jurisprudence was
traditionally pro-employee, as evidenced by its broad interpretations of
statutory antiretaliation provisions.119 Given the Court’s reputation as proNassar establishes a simple and universally applicable rule that a jury should be instructed with a
“but for” causation standard under every federal employment statute except Title VII’s
prohibition against discrimination. In these cases, a one-size-fits-all rule was much needed,
considering that the proper causation standard had before depended upon answering such hazy
questions as whether the plaintiff produced a “thick cloud of smoke” to support her allegations of
discrimination.
111
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 2535, 2537.
113
Id. at 2541.
114
Id. at 2539 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)).
115
Id. at 2547.
116
See infra Part V; see also Toobin, supra note 29.
117
See Corbett, supra note 17, at 142.
118
See Alex Rogers, Don’t Be Fooled, It’s Gridlock Time in Washington, TIME (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://swampland.time.com/2014/01/16/dont-be-fooled-its-gridlock-time-in-washington/ [http://perma.
cc/8VFT-RR62].
119
See, e.g., infra Parts III.A–B; see also Moberly, supra note 16, at 380–92; Rosenthal, supra note
11, at 1112–13. Scholars believe that the Court’s pro-employee stance is due to its belief that
“protecting employees from retaliation will enhance the enforcement of the nation’s laws,” particularly
Title VII. E.g., Moberly, supra note 16, at 378.
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employee in retaliation cases, the outcome in Nassar was particularly
surprising because the Court reverted to the pro-employer stance that it is
known for taking in other contexts.120 This Part discusses some of the
groundbreaking cases in which the Supreme Court broadly interpreted Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision and juxtaposes these cases with Nassar.
A. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White’s Broad
Construction of the Adverse Action Standard
The Court’s 2006 decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White examined the scope of Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision to determine what types of employer conduct are unlawful.121
After Sheila White filed two separate discrimination charges with the
EEOC, she was suspended without pay for allegedly being “insubordinate”
and was only reinstated after she filed a grievance.122 White then filed a
retaliation suit alleging that her suspension and change in responsibilities
violated Title VII’s retaliation provision.123
The Court established a minimum requirement that plaintiffs must
make a showing that “a reasonable employee would have found the
challenged action materially adverse.”124 The Court inferred this standard
from the statutory text and practice and stated that it believed that the
provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective and that an
objective standard is judicially administrable.125 This standard is
considerably employee-friendly because the context surrounding an alleged
retaliatory action will be taken into account, rather than specific prohibited
acts, and the standard only screens out claims involving “petty slights,
minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.”126
Essentially, the materially adverse standard casts a broad net that holds
employers liable for as many acts as possible that are likely to dissuade
employees from opposing unlawful employment practices. Applying the
new materially adverse standard to White’s case, the Court found that the
reassignment of her responsibilities and her suspension without pay would
120

Michael Zimmer tempers this assertion when he claims that “[i]n other ways, it was not a
surprise that the Court would move its retaliation jurisprudence more in line with its recent proemployer, anti-civil rights interpretation of statutes typified by its decision in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services.” Zimmer, supra note 24, at 705. For a discussion of the Court’s pro-employer stance in other
contexts, see Moberly, supra note 16, at 377 & n.4, and Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme
Court?: The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 917–18 (2009).
121
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
122
Id. at 58.
123
Id. at 59.
124
Id. at 68.
125
Id. at 68–69.
126
Id. at 68.
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have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee and upheld the
jury’s findings of retaliation.127
By broadly interpreting Title VII’s antiretaliation provision in
Burlington, the Supreme Court enhanced the enforcement of Title VII by
ensuring that plaintiffs would continue to have unfettered access to Title
VII’s remedial mechanisms.
B. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP: Extending Protected
Status to Third-Parties
In 2011, the Supreme Court examined in Thompson v. North American
Stainless, LP whether a third party may sue under Title VII’s retaliation
provision if the individual is punished as a result of his close relation with a
complaining employee.128 Petitioner Eric Thompson and his fiancée,
Miriam Regalado, were both employees of North American Stainless.129
Three weeks after Regalado filed a charge with the EEOC alleging sex
discrimination, Thompson was fired.130 He alleged that North American
Stainless fired him to retaliate against Regalado for filing her EEOC
charge.131
The Court found that Thompson’s termination violated Title VII
because the antiretaliation provision prohibits a broad range of employer
acts, and reasonable workers might be dissuaded from engaging in
protected activity if they knew a loved one would be fired.132 The Court
ruled that Thompson fell “within the zone of interests protected by Title
VII” because he was an employee of North American Stainless and not an
accidental victim of retaliation.133
Thompson’s finding that Title VII protects third-party victims of
retaliation falls in line with the Supreme Court’s historically broad,
employee-friendly interpretations of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.
The tides may be turning, however, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s
narrow rendering of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision in Nassar.

127

Id. at 70–73.
562 U.S. 170 (2011).
129
Id. at 172–73.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 174.
133
Id. at 178. The Court adopted the “zone of interests” test because it allows any plaintiff with an
interest protected by Title VII to sue while effectively screening out those who “might technically be
injured” per Article III but have interests unrelated to Title VII. Id.
128
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IV. NASSAR’S INCONSISTENT CONSEQUENCES
Many scholars decry Nassar’s failure to extend the mixed-motive,
motivating factor analysis to Title VII cases. They argue that employing
but-for causation in Title VII retaliation cases will “likely further depress
the already dismal success rates of anti-discrimination plaintiffs”134 and
“encourage or require lower courts to require something approaching ‘sole’
causation in many federal civil rights cases . . . —a virtual impossibility in
practical terms.”135 Furthermore, some believe such a standard will impose
a burden on plaintiffs that “is not demanded of almost any other employee
claiming retaliation under a wide variety of other laws prohibiting
retaliation.”136 By interpreting Title VII’s antiretaliation provision
differently from its antidiscrimination provision, the Nassar decision is at
odds with the Court’s traditional in pari materia interpretation of
employment discrimination statutes, particularly because the two
provisions are within the same statute.137 Some may argue that treating the
two sections in pari materia would create a redundancy within Title VII,
which most courts try to avoid when interpreting statutes, but the sections
deal with two related—yet different—aspects of employment
discrimination law, and construing the sections in pari materia would
afford greater protections to claimants and achieve more of Title VII’s
overarching goals.
Furthermore, requiring a showing of but-for causation effectively
hinders the retaliation provision’s purpose of maintaining “unfettered”
access to statutory remedial mechanisms138 because it would not deter the
many forms that retaliation can take.139 Instead, the standard “lets
discriminators get away with discrimination, under-deters discrimination,
and unfairly allocates windfall in overdetermined cases entirely to
defendants.”140 This Part argues that public policy and congressional intent
134

Katie Eyer, Sole Motives and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 17, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/06/solemotives-and-university-of-texas-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar.html
[http://perma.cc/J6PSBU3] (citing Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2012)).
135
Id.
136
Drachsler, supra note 16, at 205.
137
See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
138
See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (discussing the primary purpose of
antiretaliation provisions).
139
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006) (noting that one of the
antiretaliation provision’s objectives is deterring the “many forms that effective retaliation can take”);
see also Sanchez, supra note 20, at 546–47.
140
Katz, supra note 18, at 880 (explaining the normative problems with Gross’s definition of
“because of” in ADEA cases); see also Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII:
Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 494 (2006).
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provide victims of retaliation with broader protections under Title VII than
victims of discrimination.141 To support such assertions, it examines two
easily successful, pre-Nassar mixed-motive retaliation cases and illustrates
the difficulties these plaintiffs would now face using a but-for causation
standard to prove their claims.
A. Fabela v. Socorro Independent School District
Before the Gross Court imposed the first restrictions on the use of the
mixed-motive framework, in Fabela v. Socorro Independent School
District the Fifth Circuit examined whether plaintiff Alicia Fabela’s
termination was causally linked with a prior discrimination charge Fabela
filed with the EEOC.142 While working at another school in the District,
Fabela filed a charge with the EEOC alleging the school’s principal
discriminated against and sexually harassed her.143 The EEOC dismissed
her charge and Fabela requested an immediate transfer to another school,
which was granted.144 For the following five years, Fabela received positive
evaluations at her new post until, in 1997, she started having problems with
a new principal, Reinhart.145
Disagreements between Reinhart and Fabela ultimately led to Reinhart
recommending Fabella’s immediate discharge in a letter to the Assistant
Superintendent, Marcee.146 Marcee concurred with Reinhart’s
recommendation and authored Fabela’s official notice of dismissal.147
Fabela appealed her termination. During a review session conducted by the
District, Marcee testified that the District wished to terminate Fabela
because she was a “problem employee” and, in citing various instances of
her “problem behavior,” mentioned the fact that “Fabela had filed an
unsubstantiated EEOC claim in 1991.”148 Marcee also asked the Director of
Personnel Services to read the EEOC determination letter aloud during the
review session.149

141

See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 66 (“[W]e do not accept . . . [the] view that it is ‘anomalous’ to read
the statute to provide broader protection for victims of retaliation than for those whom Title VII
primarily seeks to protect, namely, victims of . . . discrimination.”).
142
329 F.3d 409, 414, 416 (5th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Xerox Corp.,
602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010). In Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d at 330, the Fifth Circuit ruled on the issue of
Fabela’s direct evidence requirement and held that, in light of Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90
(2003), Fabela’s direct evidence requirement for Title VII retaliation cases is invalid.
143
Fabela, 329 F.3d at 411.
144
Id. at 412.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 412–13.
148
Id. at 413 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149
Id.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District,
finding that, despite direct evidence of Marcee’s statements, it, “standing
alone, was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find a causal
connection between the EEOC charge, and Fabela’s dismissal.”150 The Fifth
Circuit reversed the lower court’s finding, holding that it erred in failing to
evaluate whether Fabela’s direct evidence “truly standing alone” was
sufficient to support a causal nexus between Fabela’s protected conduct
and her termination.151 The court accordingly applied the Price Waterhouse
framework, remarking in a footnote, “[T]o successfully establish the
element of causation . . . Fabela’s evidence does not have to support the
conclusion that retaliation was the only motive or even that it was the
determinative motive, only that it was among the motivating factors which
led to the adverse action.”152 The Fifth Circuit found the direct evidence
was sufficient to support a causal nexus and that a reasonable jury could
conclude that Fabela was dismissed, in part, because of her 1991 EEOC
charge.153
Because Nassar’s stringent but-for causation standard would today
require Fabela to prove that her 1991 EEOC charge was the main driving
force behind her termination, the Fifth Circuit would presently be forced to
reject her retaliation claim due to the precedent set forth by the Supreme
Court. This outcome seems absurd, given that strong direct evidence such
as Marcee’s testimony is rare in retaliation cases and that most claims are
founded upon weaker forms of evidence.154 That cases such as Fabela’s
could easily be screened out under Nassar’s but-for analysis reveals the
overdeterrent effect of the Court’s opinion and how it runs counter to
public policy and the primary purposes of Title VII’s retaliation provision.
B. Smith v. Xerox Corp.
Prior to Nassar, the Fifth Circuit in Smith v. Xerox Corp. rejected the
application of Gross to Title VII retaliation claims and held that claimants
may use a mixed-motive analysis to prove that their protected conduct was
a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.155
Kim Smith was an employee of Xerox Corporation for nearly twentytwo years, during which time she received positive evaluations and, in
2003, an award only bestowed on the company’s top eight performing
150

Id. at 416.
Id. at 416–18.
152
Id. at 417 n.7.
153
Id. at 416–17.
154
See id. at 415 (noting it is an “unusual instance” when plaintiffs are able to support their claims
with direct evidence of retaliatory motive).
155
See 602 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133
S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
151
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employees.156 In 2005, however, Steve Jankowski became the manager of
Smith’s sales territory, and at the same time, her territory and the number
of agents she supported was reduced.157 Soon, Smith was unable to meet
her sales goals, and Jankowski sent her a Performance Improvement
Process (PIP) warning letter and placed Smith on a ninety-day warning
period, followed by a sixty-day probationary term because Smith was not
meeting her revenue plan.158 The letter stated that if Smith failed to perform
at a satisfactory level, including “making up her entire year’s shortfall and
meeting 100% of her revenue plan,” she could be terminated.159
After Jankowski denied Smith’s request to reconsider the duration of
her probation period, Smith filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC.
The charge alleged that Jankowski placed her in the PIP intending to
terminate her employment and that he did so based on her age, gender, and
race.160 At the conclusion of her probationary period, Smith was
terminated.161 Although she had only achieved approximately 74% of her
revenue goals by that point, Smith argued that Jankowski terminated her
out of retaliation for her EEOC charge.162
Smith provided strong circumstantial evidence to show that Jankowski
began the termination process before the end of her probation period,
contrary to company policy. First, Smith provided a fax sent to human
resources, dated seven business days after her EEOC charge was filed.163
The fax included an involuntary termination request form seeking Smith’s
termination.164 Second, a human resources manager testified that the “letter
of concern” Jankowski sent Smith several weeks after Smith filed her
EEOC charge would violate company policy if Jankowski sent it without
first speaking with Smith to get an explanation about Smith’s actions in the
workplace (which Smith alleged he failed to do).165 Third, Jankowski’s
signature and the human resources manager’s signature on the involuntary
termination request form were both dated several days before Smith alleges
revenue numbers typically became available for the preceding month.166
The Fifth Circuit held that, even though there was a legal business
justification that “Jankowski naturally would demand that Smith meet high
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 323, 325.
Id. at 325.
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standards, the failure of which could lead to adverse consequences,”
Smith’s evidence proved her EEOC discrimination claim was a “motivating
factor in the termination decision.”167 It thus upheld in part the lower
court’s jury instruction on the mixed-motive framework.168
Although Smith’s case did not involve the strong, direct evidence of
retaliation like that presented in Fabela, it is arguable that Smith’s
circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent was more likely to yield a
successful claim than Nassar’s. Under Nassar’s but-for causation standard,
Smith would likely have been unable to meet her burden of proving that,
but for her EEOC charge, her termination would not have occurred.
This standard is particularly difficult for plaintiffs such as Smith to
show given the need for complex counterfactuals. Xerox’s policies “permit,
and arguably encourage, lesser actions such as reassignment or demotion,
rather than termination, for an employee with a tenure and track record as
lengthy as Smith’s.”169 Therefore, under a but-for standard, Smith must
show that Xerox’s claims that Smith was fired because she failed to meet
her revenue goals were false. Only after ruling out all other possibilities,
and providing affirmative evidence to show that her protected EEOC action
was the real cause of her termination, would her retaliation claim have
prevailed. It would have been nearly impossible, given the limited
information she had and the numerous factors that contributed to her
termination, for Smith to have proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that her EEOC charge was the primary cause for her termination.
Smith represents a typical retaliation plaintiff with evidence stronger
than the plaintiff in Nassar, and yet it is unlikely her claim would prevail
under today’s Title VII retaliation jurisprudence.170 While the Court’s
concern over frivolous retaliation claims and the resulting waste of courts’
167

Id. at 334.
Id. at 334, 336.
169
Id. at 334.
170
Similar cases have been rejected under the post-Nassar but-for standard that would have
prevailed under the motivating factor standard. See, e.g., Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ., No. 1100078-CG-M, 2013 WL 5758699, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2013) (“Shumate could defeat summary
judgment with that evidence when she didn’t have to show that her protected conduct was the reason
she didn’t get the job, just that it factored in to the decision. But post-Nassar, Shumate has to meet a
higher standard . . . [, which the] evidence does not support . . . .”); Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, No.
TJS-10-1933, 2013 WL 5487813, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2013) (“Even assuming that these instances
are ‘probative of causation,’ Ms. Foster cannot now meet the heightened causation standard under
Nassar.”); Hubbard v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:11-CV-290 (CAR), 2013 WL 3964908, at
*1 (M.D. Ga. July 31, 2013) (“In its original Order, the Court also cited evidence that only a week to
ten days after her complaint, Board members began meeting with Plaintiff’s direct supervisor about her
employment. While this evidence, combined with the temporal proximity of less than three months, was
enough to satisfy a ‘motivating factor’ causation standard, it is not enough to satisfy the ‘but-for’
causation standard.”). It is noteworthy that all of these cases held in favor of the plaintiffs pre-Nassar
but found for the defendants in subsequent post-Nassar motions to reconsider.
168
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time and resources may be valid,171 Smith’s case illustrates how Nassar’s
but-for standard filters out valid retaliation claims and leaves victims
without remedies, contrary to congressional intent.172
V. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO CIRCUMVENT NASSAR’S POTENTIALLY
NEGATIVE IMPACT AND PROTECT RETALIATION CLAIMANTS
Applying Nassar’s but-for causation standard to Alicia Fabela’s and
Kim Smith’s cases highlights the incredibly overbroad screen-out rate the
but-for causation standard will have on Title VII claimants with strong
evidence of retaliation.173 Despite the Court’s deviation from its traditional
broad construction of antiretaliation statutes,174 it is unlikely that the bills
proposed after Nassar by Senator Tom Harkin and Representative George
Miller to clarify the appropriate standards for federal employment
discrimination and retaliation claims will gain any traction in Congress.175
Thus, to stem Nassar’s negative impact on future Title VII retaliation
claimants, alternative “fixes” that counterbalance Nassar and fortify Title
VII’s antiretaliation enforcement are necessary.176
This Part proposes two possible solutions. First, it offers a judicial fix
that courts and even the EEOC can use to reinterpret the meaning of but-for
causation, in line with modern principles of tort law, to limit the number of
171

See supra Part II.
See Kimberly Cheeseman, Recent Development, Smith v. Xerox Corp.: The Fifth Circuit
Maintains Mixed-Motive Applicability in Title VII Retaliation Claims, 85 TUL. L. REV. 1395, 1404
(2011) (“The Fifth Circuit’s decision is consistent with Congress’s intent to ensure that the outlet for
plaintiffs experiencing civil rights violations in the workforce is not constricted to the point of
closure.”).
173
Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem
in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 30 (1991) (“[T]he policies underlying Title
VII require that it should not be that hard for the plaintiff to establish a violation.”). Gudel further notes:
[P]lacing the burden on the plaintiff in a Title VII case to establish “but for” causation is simply
incompatible with the nature of Title VII as a remedial statute. This intuition is usually coupled
with another one: that fairness requires that the burden of proof in mixed motive cases be placed
on the defendant because the defendant’s actions have created the problem of proof.
Id. at 32 (footnote omitted); see also 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 186 (2d ed. 2011)
(“In a number of cases, however, the but-for test of factual cause puts the plaintiff out of court, even
though the defendant is clearly negligent.”).
174
See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66 (2006) (“[W]e do not
accept . . . [the] view that it is ‘anomalous’ to read the statute to provide broader protection for victims
of retaliation than for those whom Title VII primarily seeks to protect, namely, victims of . . .
discrimination.”).
175
This assertion is supported by the fact that both Senator Harkin and Representative Miller’s bills
are stuck at the committee stage. See S. 1391, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2852, 113th Cong. (2013); see
also supra Part II.
176
Cf. Tananbaum, supra note 10, at 1151 (“Anti-retaliation provisions are just as important as
anti-discrimination provisions . . . and just as difficult to prove, because employees have little access to
employers’ decision-making processes and will not easily be able to show any more than motivating
factor causation.”).
172
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discriminators that escape liability. Second, it recommends an agency fix in
which the EEOC’s enforcement powers are enhanced by simple changes to
its enforcement powers, which will encourage compliance with Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision, root out frivolous retaliation claims, and ensure
that noncomplying employers do not experience any windfalls.177
A. The Judicial Fix: Lower Courts Should Apply Principles of Modern
Tort Law to Title VII Retaliation Cases
In Nassar, the Court imported principles of tort law into employment
discrimination law under the assumption that this was Congress’s intent
“absent an indication to the contrary in [Title VII] itself.”178 Supporting
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent,179 many scholars180 criticize the Court’s
“[oversimplification of] modern tort law and its approach to causation”181
by adopting the but-for causation requirement and argue that its
interpretation fails to reflect the complexities of modern tort law.182
Employment discrimination law is not based on the common law, does not
involve objectively measurable or observable physical phenomena, and
most closely mirrors the law of intentional torts instead of the law of
negligence.183 Despite the fact that it is problematic to apply principles of
causation to employment discrimination law, the judicial fixes suggested in
this section operate under the Supreme Court’s presumptions as announced
in Nassar.184
177

Robert Tananbaum discusses how the but-for causation standard allows potentially
discriminatory employers to escape liability. Id. at 1158 (“Where the employer has articulated a
legitimate potential justification for its decision, it seems virtually impossible for the employee then to
demonstrate that the impermissible retaliatory motive was a necessary reason in the employer’s
calculus.”).
178
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2520 (2013).
179
See id. at 2534–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180
See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 83, at 80–81; Katz, supra note 140, at 544; Tananbaum, supra note
10, at 1149.
181
John K. DiMugno, United States Supreme Court Curtails Federal Protection of Consumers and
Employees, 34 CAL. TORT REP. 204, 208 (2013).
182
See Katz, supra note 140, at 494 (“[D]isparate treatment law should adopt some of the parts of
tort law it seems to have left behind in its partial borrowing of causal concepts.”); Zimmer, supra note
24, at 712 n.39.
183
See Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235,
1242 (1988) (“Tort law has its genesis in the common law. Since the national policy against
discrimination in employment is not based on the common law, a strong argument can be made that
causal analysis should not be as critical an element in employment discrimination law as it is in the law
of negligence.” (footnote omitted)); DiMugno, supra note 181, at 207–08 (arguing but-for causation
was developed to analyze physical actions resulting from a defendant’s negligence, not intentional
torts); Gudel, supra note 173, at 88–89.
184
For an analysis of how courts have dealt with the issue of tort-like causation in other civil rights
cases, see Joel Flaxman, Note, Proximate Cause in Constitutional Torts: Holding Interrogators Liable
for Fifth Amendment Violations at Trial, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1554–63 (2007), which discusses
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Two steps are relevant to employment discrimination plaintiffs in the
but-for analysis: first, they must speculate and create a counterfactual
hypothesis removing the defendant’s wrongful conduct from the picture;
and second, they must then determine whether their injuries still would
have occurred absent the defendant’s improper conduct.185 Requiring
plaintiffs to formulate counterfactuals based on events that never occurred
creates difficulties in tort law,186 and more so in the employment
discrimination context where plaintiffs are often at a disadvantage because
they do not have access to all the factors an employer took into account
when making its decision.187 As a result, by the early twenty-first century,
courts applying tort principles began to move away from using but-for
causation in all common law tort cases.188 Otherwise, a strict application in
cases involving multiple causes “would defeat liability, because a plaintiff
would not be able to show that but for the negligent conduct of one
defendant the plaintiff would not have been injured.”189 Such results were
thought to violate “both an intuitive sense of causation and good legal
policy.”190
Accordingly, the law evolved to analyze factual causation in a more
realistic way. Courts began accounting for multiple causal factors and
determining cases involving multiple tortious causes by inquiring whether
the defendant’s actions were a substantial factor in bringing about the
plaintiff’s harm.191 Notably, section 27 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
does not use “substantial factor” terminology and merely mandates that if
several causes are sufficient by themselves to cause the plaintiff’s harm,
they are each factual causes of the plaintiff’s harm.192 Although section 27’s
how lower courts did not adhere closely to the Supreme Court’s mandate in Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277 (1980), and instead adopted a different construction of “common law” causation analysis.
185
MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 240 (2008).
186
1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 173, § 187.
187
See Vlasak, supra note 100, at 6.
188
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 316 & n. 45 (expanded ed. 2003).
189
Id. at 316 & nn. 45–46.
190
1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 173, § 189.
191
See, e.g., Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 742 P.2d 377, 386 (Haw. 1987) (finding that
the “substantial factor” inquiry is the “touchstone when the issue of causal relation must be submitted to
the jury); Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149, 152–60 (Kan. 1984) (noting critical commentary on
the use of the “but for” test of causation and upholding consensus that a jury must decide whether
“conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm”); Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 677
(Alaska 1981) (permitting jury findings that defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing
about plaintiff’s harm); see also GEISTFELD, supra note 185, at 253; Clarke, supra note 83, at 80–81.
192
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27 (2006) (“If multiple acts occur, each of which alone
would have been a factual cause under § 26 of the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the
other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”); see also 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note
173, § 189. Unlike section 27 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
uses substantial factor terminology: “If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor’s
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language did not appear in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was
operative when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed, it would have
included more conduct as a but-for cause.193 This is significant in a postNassar world because courts could employ section 27’s nuanced approach
in mixed-motive cases requiring but-for causation194 and find a defendant,
who may have escaped liability under a strict but-for preponderance
analysis, liable.195 If applied to Nassar’s case, a court could find that
Nassar’s violation of the hospital’s affiliation agreement was one cause for
his termination and that the retaliatory intent was also a sufficient cause in
bringing about Nassar’s termination, particularly because the hospital likely
would have hired him had Fitz not mentioned the affiliation agreement.
Therefore, the court could also find that the retaliation was a but-for cause
in his termination and could hold the hospital liable for violating Title VII.
Thus, to counterbalance the deleterious effects of Nassar, courts
should adopt the Third Restatement of Tort’s sufficiency analysis because
it aligns with modern tort law, reflects a practical understanding of real
world events, prevents defendants from gaining a windfall by avoiding
liability under a strict but-for test, and does not require complicated and
often erroneous counterfactuals. More importantly, this liberal
interpretation of but-for causation allows Title VII’s retaliation provision to
achieve its purpose of “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms”196 and deterring “the many forms that effective
retaliation can take.”197
Should courts decline to adopt section 27’s approach to resolving
inquiries involving multiple causes, courts should adopt the liberal but-for
analysis set forth by Judges Cardozo and Traynor:
[I]f (a) a negligent act was deemed wrongful because that act increased the
chances that a particular type of accident would occur, and (b) a mishap of
that very sort did happen, this was enough to support a finding by the trier of
fact that the negligent behavior caused the harm.198
negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring
about harm to another, the actor’s negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it
about.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965) (emphasis added).
193
See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1437
n.22 (2012).
194
See DiMugno, supra note 181.
195
See GEISTFELD, supra note 185, at 252; see also Katz, supra note 140, at 549.
196
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (discussing the primary purpose of
antiretaliation provisions).
197
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006); see also Sanchez, supra
note 20, at 547.
198
GEISTFELD, supra note 185, at 242–43; id. (“By routinely submitting these cases [applying the
liberal rule of but-for causation] to the jury, courts appear to be relaxing the plaintiff’s burden of
proving factual causation with a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note
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This would mean that in the employment discrimination context, if
retaliation increased the chances that the person was terminated on other
grounds, and such an injury occurred, the retaliation could support a
finding that it was a “but-for” cause of the harm. Under this analysis,
retaliation is deemed wrongful because it discourages reasonable
employees from reporting or cooperating with discrimination
investigations. To establish causation, plaintiffs would have to show only
that an adverse action decreased other employees’ likelihood to engage in
protected conduct under Title VII. Thus, in Nassar’s case,199 because Fitz’s
retaliatory intent prompted her to bring the affiliation agreement violation
to the hospital’s attention to have Nassar terminated, and he was, a court
could find that her retaliatory intent was a but-for cause of Nassar’s harm.
Either of these two alternatives to strict but-for causation, which still
fall under the umbrella of tort law’s but-for causation analysis, should be
adopted by courts interpreting Nassar to prevent the overdetermined screen
out rate that would result from a strict but-for analysis. If so, plaintiffs such
as Fabela and Smith200 will be able to meet their burden of proof and their
employers will not easily escape liability.
B. The Agency Fix: Using the EEOC as an Effective Enforcer
After an employee files a charge with the EEOC, a notice of the
charge is sent to the employer within ten days of the filing.201 If the charge
is not sent to mediation or mediation fails, the EEOC commences an
investigation to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the
employer has engaged in prohibited conduct.202 As part of its investigation,
the EEOC has the power to issue subpoenas and may conduct a formal factfinding conference.203 If the EEOC issues a “reasonable cause”
determination at the close of its investigation, it will attempt to resolve the
claim through conciliation.204 If conciliation efforts fail, the EEOC may
bring a suit in federal court on behalf of the claimant or issue a right-to-sue
letter.205 Even in cases where the EEOC makes a no reasonable cause
determination, it will issue a right-to-sue letter if claimants desire to pursue

173, § 191 (“Courts are avowedly liberal with such causation issues and many cases have permitted an
inference of factual causation along these lines.” (footnote omitted)).
199
See supra Part II.
200
See supra Part IV.
201
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012).
202
Id.
203
Id.; see also § 2000e-8 (investigations); § 2000e-9 (conduct of hearings and investigations
pursuant to § 161 of Title 29).
204
§ 2000e-5(b).
205
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
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their claims privately in federal court.206 This current system is weighed
down by a case backlog due to budgetary and staff limitations, however,207
and as a result is struggling to accomplish its mission of preventing any
person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice.
Therefore, in addition to recommending courts adopt a liberalized butfor causation standard in future Title VII retaliation cases, this Note
proposes a novel regulatory solution to Nassar’s problematic
consequences: enhance the EEOC’s enforcement powers such that
employers are rewarded or punished based on their compliance or
noncompliance with Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. This fix serves to
counterbalance windfalls discriminatory defendants may gain under but-for
causation analysis.208 Although the EEOC is the “sole arm of the federal
government with an exclusive focus on eradicating job discrimination,”209
the agency is currently thought to be ineffective at achieving optimal
enforcement of Title VII.210 Thus, these proposed improvements aim to
help the EEOC achieve maximum enforcement despite its limited
resources.211
First, the EEOC should charge a penalty fee at the preliminary stage in
handling claims where, after a thorough investigation,212 the EEOC finds
reasonable cause to believe that employment discrimination has occurred or
discriminatory employment practices are present.213 Regulations carrying
civil monetary penalties are common under other statutes such as the Fair
206

Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b)(3) (2014).
See infra notes 218–19 and accompanying text.
208
See Katz, supra note 18, at 885 (“If those who consider protected characteristics can, in some
cases, . . . get away with such discrimination, then there is less than optimal deterrence.”).
209
Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy:
Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 53 (1995);
see also Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 671, 704 (2005).
210
See Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination
Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 231 (2009) (“The
structure of the agency, its functions, and its lack of funding all serve to make the agency ineffective at
creating systemic change.”); Nancy M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L. REV. 1237, 1271
(2010); White, supra note 209, at 56.
211
See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(a) (2014). The lack of EEOC personnel and resources is startling:
“Most recently, the Commission operated without all five commissioners from 1997 to 2004, and
without a general counsel from 2000 to 2003. Out of about 76,000 private sector charges, the EEOC has
the resources to file suit in only about 300 cases.” McCormick, supra note 210, at 219 (footnote
omitted).
212
See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a) (2014). For a discussion of the EEOC’s investigatory powers, see
Title VII: EEOC Proceedings, in PRIMER ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 193, 195–96 (Nancy
J. Sedmak & Chrissie Vidas eds., 6th ed. 1994), and Occhialino & Vail, supra note 209, at 705.
213
Other scholars have suggested similar remedies, often in the form of attorneys’ fees, to enhance
EEOC enforcement. See Modesitt, supra note 210, at 1271. For a discussion of the EEOC’s reasonable
cause standards, see infra note 221.
207
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Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the
Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act.214 A similar penalty in the
employment discrimination context will serve to mitigate any windfalls
discriminatory employers may gain by a court’s use of the but-for standard
and creates additional monetary incentives for employers to vigorously
enforce Title VII in the workplace.215 Increased employer compliance in
turn will lead to fewer employment discrimination claims and the EEOC
will have more resources freed up to investigate and address more serious
claims. To account for frivolous claims, which the agency will likely
identify during its investigations and classify as “no cause,” the penalty fee
will only apply to cases with a reasonable cause determination.216
This penalty fee, in addition to encouraging compliance with Title
VII,217 could serve as a vital source of revenue for the beleaguered EEOC
by covering costs incurred investigating an individual’s charge.218 It could
even create space in the budget for the hiring and training of additional
investigators, which would expedite the backlogged claim-handling process
and lead to more efficient and thorough investigations.219 In a further effort
to balance the scales in a post-Nassar world, the EEOC could apply one of
the liberalized but-for causation standards mentioned above220 during its
reasonable cause inquiry221 and the conciliation stage.222 A liberal but-for
214

See David Weil, Implementing Employment Regulation: Insights on the Determinants of
Regulatory Performance, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 429, 444
(Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997); see also Modesitt, supra note 210, at 1274.
215
Some may argue that employers already have a monetary incentive not to discriminate due to
the high cost of litigating employment discrimination claims, but this argument is misplaced. Many
employment discrimination claims are settled through mediation or arbitration and do not make it to the
litigation stage, and in many cases do not make it to the EEOC. See Ellen Berrey et al., Situated Justice:
A Contextual Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1, 12 (2012) (“Most people who believe they have experienced discrimination do not
pursue a lawsuit.”); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil
Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 498 (1993). This proposal would bolster these
weak monetary incentives and make it even more appealing for employers to comply with the law.
216
This suggestion takes into account the Nassar Court’s concern over the filing of frivolous
claims “siphon[ing] resources from efforts by employer, administrative agencies, and courts.” Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013).
217
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 520 (2001) (“Liability avoidance certainly provided crucial incentives to
change, but economic and ethical motivations figured prominently [in the design and implementation of
internal problem-solving processes] as well.”).
218
See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 209, at 703.
219
David Weil illustrates how staffing limitations impacted the EEOC’s rate of claims processing:
“In 1993 the EEOC had 87,942 complaints filed with it (versus the 56,228 complaints it received in
1981). In that year the commission pursued a mere 481 lawsuits.” Weil, supra note 214, at 442.
220
See supra Part V.A.
221
1 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 40.2 (2006) (“A
determination of reasonable cause is a finding that it is more likely than not that the charging party,
aggrieved persons, and/or members of a class were discriminated against because of a basis prohibited
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standard is appropriate because these stages consider the likelihood of
success if the claim results in litigation.223
Second, in addition to adopting punitive measures for noncompliance,
the EEOC can strengthen Title VII enforcement by rewarding employers
who comply with the statute’s mandates. The EEOC can adopt an approval
rating system, similar to a consumer report or the government’s Energy
Star rating,224 in which it identifies and rewards those companies that
comply with Title VII’s mandates. This program could be created under the
powers granted to the EEOC in § 2000e-4(h)(2), which concerns
educational and outreach programs.225 It would publish a list of the names
of employers who, in the last year, had perfect or nearly perfect compliance
with Title VII’s provisions (as determined by the number of charges filed
against a company).226 Such a rating system not only deters violators by
by the statutes enforced by EEOC. The likelihood that discrimination occurred is assessed based upon
evidence that establishes, under the appropriate legal theory, a prima facie case and, if the respondent
has provided a viable defense, evidence of pretext.” (citation omitted)). The EEOC applies a “litigationworthy” standard during its reasonable cause determinations. Michael D. Moberly, Admission Possible:
Reconsidering the Impact of EEOC Reasonable Cause Determinations in the Ninth Circuit, 24 PEPP. L.
REV. 37, 39 n.13 (1996). Therefore, if the EEOC applies a stringent but-for standard, it will likely
overdetermine and screen out numerous cases. To give plaintiffs the fairest chance at litigating their
claims, the EEOC should instead apply a liberal but-for causation standard. See id.
222
The conciliation stage is a thirty-day period that follows an EEOC finding of “reasonable cause”
wherein the EEOC attempts to work out a settlement agreement between the parties. This occurs before
a suit may be filed. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (2014); see also Title VII: EEOC Proceedings, supra note 212,
at 197. The issue of causation may also arise in this case as the parties consider possible remedies and
determine what relief is justified based on the facts and law. The EEOC has a wide range of discretion
in constructing remedies and thus can apply a more liberal standard of causation in determining an
employer’s liability and the remedies due to the claimant. This is a win–win system because the
employer is able to save time and costs by avoiding litigation, and the employee receives relief that a
court applying a stringent but-for causation standard may not grant. The EEOC Compliance manual
states the liberal standards applied during the conciliation stage:
[Parties must] [f]ashion remedies from the wide range of remedial measures available to EEOC,
which has broad authority under the statutes to seek appropriate forms of relief. [The EEOC may]
[t]ailor remedies, as necessary, to cure specific situations giving rise to the violations and
incorporate the appropriate remedial elements described in the Remedies Policy.
1 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 60.2(a).
223
See McCormick, supra note 210, at 204–05 (discussing the EEOC’s push, and relative
successes, at implementing a mediation program).
224
See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1208 (2012); McCormick, supra note 210, at 230.
225
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(h)(2) (2012) (“In exercising its powers under this subchapter, the
Commission shall carry out educational and outreach activities (including dissemination of information
in languages other than English) targeted to—(A) individuals who historically have been victims of
employment discrimination and have not been equitably served by the Commission; and (B) individuals
on whose behalf the Commission has authority to enforce any other law prohibiting employment
discrimination, concerning rights and obligations under this subchapter or such law, as the case may
be.”).
226
Although implementing such a system does carry its own costs, these costs can be controlled by
enlisting the help of third-party entities or imposing a self-evaluation process. The costs will depend on
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“impos[ing] reputational and other market pressures” on employers,227 but
it also benefits employees by making information about their employer’s
practices more readily accessible.228
These proposed administrative fixes aim to correct an imbalance of
power created by the but-for causation requirement in Title VII retaliation
cases. These penalties and incentives for compliance serve to “make clear
that discriminatory conduct is prohibited irrespective of its effect on
plaintiffs and ensure that such conduct is adequately deterred.”229 Adopting
just one of these recommendations will go far in enhancing the EEOC’s
enforcement powers and ensuring employer compliance.230
Although the penalty fee recommendation requires legislative action,
which, as previously discussed, is hard to come by in today’s political
climate,231 these proposed fixes are more likely to garner the attention and
support of Congress. Unlike the Protecting Older Workers Against
Discrimination Act (POWADA),232 which requires minute changes to
obscure causation language hidden deep in an employment discrimination
statute, these agency fixes involve changes to a regulatory agency with
great visibility. Additionally, allowing the EEOC to charge penalties for
noncompliance is a low-cost solution to address the agency’s inefficiencies.

the structure of the approval rating system, and while it will require significant investment upfront,
penalty fees collected by the EEOC, such as those proposed in this section, could help offset the cost.
This program could lead to greater efficiency and compliance with the laws, leading to savings for the
EEOC on other fronts, such as claims investigations or litigation. See infra note 228; Weil, supra note
214, at 465 (“The review of the compliance literature suggests higher levels of compliance among firms
subject to even modest regulatory pressure.”). For a discussion of the costs associated with
implementing a rating system, see LOUISE STONEY, UNITED WAY, FINANCING QUALITY RATING
SYSTEMS: LESSONS LEARNED 2–3 (2004), available at http://www.earlychildhoodfinance.org/
downloads/2004/StoneyQRISfinance_2004.pdf [http://perma.cc/B4WC-4AWA].
227
Glover, supra note 224. These ratings systems can have a powerful effect. See Jessica E.
Fliegelman, The Next Generation of Greenwash: Diminishing Consumer Confusion Through a National
Eco-Labeling Program, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1006 (2010) (“[S]eventy-seven percent of
consumers considered a company’s ‘environmentally-friendly’ reputation to be significant. As a result,
green advertising [such as the Energy Star label] has the potential to produce environmental benefits
through greater consumer awareness because it can aid consumers in making meaningful marketplace
choices.” (footnote omitted)).
228
See Glover, supra note 224, at 1208; Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure
and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 578 & n.12 (2012) (“The chief insight, based on
behavioral research, is that the public faces significant cognitive limitations in processing
information. . . . [E]ffective forms of regulatory disclosure are ‘targeted’: simplified disclosures
embedded at the point of decisionmaking to ‘nudge’ parties along.”).
229
Katz, supra note 140, at 494.
230
See Weil, supra note 214, at 465 (“The review of the compliance literature suggests higher
levels of compliance among firms subject to even modest regulatory pressure.”).
231
See Rogers, supra note 118.
232
See S. 1391, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2852, 113th Cong. (2013).
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There are several incentives for Congress to amend §§ 2000e-4 and
2000e-5 to grant the EEOC the power to impose statutory penalties for
noncompliance with agency rules. First, Congress will be more inclined to
spend its limited political capital rallying for a change to a visible
government agency that constituents recognize and derive observable
benefits from. There is little reason for Congress to expend its time and
resources in the currently volatile political climate fixing the substantive
language of a statute that will garner little attention or appreciation from its
constituents. Second, lawmakers can see a return on their investment of
political capital if they make these recommended changes to the EEOC’s
enforcement provisions. Constituents will likely appreciate and commend
their congressmen for assuming the more favorable stance of selling
proactive, rather than reactive or obscure, measures.233
These recommendations will help to resolve many problems plaguing
discrimination claimants. Money collected from the penalty fee can be used
to cover agency costs that are incurred during investigations and provide
the capital needed to hire additional investigators and claim handlers. This
will alleviate the backlog in cases, create more jobs, and, most importantly,
promote efficient processing of claims such that meritless claims will be
rooted out early on,234 and the Nassar Court’s concern for the judicial
system’s time and resources will be addressed.
CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross, it is unsurprising that the
Nassar Court rejected the use of the mixed motives framework and its
“motivating factor” standard in Title VII retaliation cases in favor of the
McDonnell Douglas framework’s “but-for” requirement. Nevertheless, the
Court’s deviation from its traditionally broad interpretation of Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision is problematic because, contrary to congressional
intent, the but-for standard allows discriminatory employers to escape
liability in overdetermined cases. By weakening Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision, the Court restricted the number of retaliation victims who will

233

For a discussion of the public’s reception of private and third-party regulation programs, see
Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 291, 381–82
(2014), which notes that in areas such as product safety, third-party regulation is supported, but in
matters concerning food safety, there is greater apprehension with instituting a third-party surveillance
program. Because this proposed program would not implicate the public health, and would afford
greater workplace protections to employees, it seems likely that this program would receive public
support.
234
See Robert A. Kearney, Who’s “In Charge” at the EEOC?, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 23 (2001)
(noting part of the reason cases that “would have been dropped after negative determinations by the
EEOC remain alive even though they are legally dead” is that the EEOC takes too long to investigate
charges and before a determination can be made, claimants request early right-to-sue letters).

508

109:475 (2015)

Protecting Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision

receive remuneration for their injuries and creates a windfall problem. Title
VII’s antidiscrimination provision is effectively weakened because “Title
VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who
are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses,”235 and they will be
deterred from doing so if the antiretaliation provision provides weak
protections.
This Note, unlike other scholarly commentaries that call for
congressional action to amend Title VII or the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
suggests two alternative fixes that will counterbalance Nassar’s negative
consequences. Courts should turn to the Restatement (Third) of Torts and
adopt a similar sufficiency analysis in mixed-motive retaliation cases. If a
court finds that it is not feasible to tease out whether each cause was
sufficient on its own to bring about the injury, courts should then employ
the liberal but-for analysis set forth by Judges Cardozo and Traynor,
focusing on whether the retaliatory action increased the chances that the
claimant would suffer, and did suffer, from an adverse employment action.
Under either method, courts will still comply with the Supreme Court’s
mandate of employing a but-for causation analysis, but these liberal
constructions ensure that courts are also honoring the spirit of Title VII.
While the judicial fixes are easier, and less costly, for courts to
implement, it is also essential that the EEOC’s enforcement powers are
enhanced to ensure the Court’s concerns about frivolous lawsuits are
addressed. Although the penalty and reward system may be the most
effective means of enhancing compliance among employers, it may face
opposition by those who oppose the penalties or conferring greater power
to the agency. Therefore, it may be best to first implement an employer
approval rating system because it will likely face less opposition from the
public. There are less obvious costs associated with such a program, and
the public benefit is clear because it provides often-unavailable information
to employees about their employers and the public scrutiny will incentivize
greater compliance. This measure may surprisingly garner considerable
support from the business community because the companies that will be
featured favorably on these rankings may find this program beneficial to
their public relations and recruitment efforts.
These proposals are intended to shift the conversation away from the
changes Congress should make to Title VII’s language to alternative and
more realistic solutions, such as judicial and agency fixes that will stem any
adverse effects that may arise from the Nassar decision. Whether these
fixes are adopted independently or in conjunction with one another, they
ensure that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision meets its purpose of
235

Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 1113 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
67 (2006)).
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providing employees with “unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms.”236

236

See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (discussing the primary purpose of
antiretaliation provisions).
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